This analysis was written by our Managing Director Christopher Glück and sent to clients as part of our EU Politics service.
Key takeaways
- Kamala Harris is the best case among bad options for the EU. She is predictable, believes in multilateralism, supports Ukraine and opposes the trend to US isolationism.
- But just like Biden, Harris’s relationship with the EU is fundamentally transactional. There is very limited scope for a mutual market opening, and she expects the EU to follow the US line on China.
- This is a lose-lose for the EU, but EU leaders know it will be difficult to maintain unity against Harris. The Commission would also struggle to create the necessary crisis narrative to push Member States to difficult decisions, such as on EU defence bonds.
- In the meantime, Trump’s possible return is already influencing EU policymaking, from trade defence measures to Ukraine funding and defence to industrial policy and UK relations.
Biden – the transatlanticist who wasn’t
The European press has often called Biden the last great transatlantic figure in US politics. EU leaders feel very differently about him. For all of Biden’s interest in and affinity for Europe, the relationship has remained fundamentally transactional.
Over the years, much of the enthusiasm following Biden’s election in 2020 has given way to disappointment and a fair share of disillusionment over the prospects of deepening transatlantic relations.
Biden is less confrontational and irritating than Trump but has been no less protectionist.
Under Biden, there has been no material progress on mutual market opening despite six meetings of the Trade and Technology Council.
Without any realistic positive agenda, much of the work instead focused on taking the edge off the most protectionist elements in Biden’s Inflation Reduction Act, which launched a whole range of industrial policy plans in Brussels.
Despite all the efforts, removing the Trump tariffs on steel and aluminium could not be achieved even at the bare minimum. When US negotiators broke off talks ahead of the EU-US summit in the autumn of last year, it came as a brutal reality check to the EU negotiation team, which had already briefed EU ambassadors and the press about an agreement.
At the same time, the Biden Administration leaned heavily on EU allies to support its hawkish turn on China. Both NATO and the TTC have become increasingly focused on China, which EU partners had to accept as a necessary price for keeping Washington engaged.
Californian continuity
Harris is of a different generation with less personal ties to Europe. There is little reason to hope that her approach to the EU will be any warmer than Biden’s. There’s equally little reason to expect that Biden’s predictable and transaction approach wouldn’t continue.
Harris has been the one Biden sends to the Munich Security Conference year after year to set out the case for supporting Ukraine and pushing back against the Republicans’ new isolationism, most eloquently expressed by Trump’s running mate, J.D. Vance.
And Harris has done so in a way that suggests her foreign policy ideals stand in the Wilsonian tradition of supporting multilateralism, international institutions and international law, within the limits of what is pragmatically achievable. This is very similar to the starting point for both Biden and Obama’s foreign policy teams.
Surprisingly little is known about her thinking on China, which she will have to clarify over the coming weeks. Considering the political climate, it is inconceivable that she would set out a less hawkish course than Biden.
The one area where we might see subtle change is on Israel, where Harris could be tempted to veer closer to the dominant positions in the Democratic party base. In recent months, she had already hinted at a tougher approach to the Israeli Government. A first test is her meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu this week. Freed from the pressure of being the candidate, Biden himself might ramp up pressure on Netanyahu.
A difficult balance for Europe
A Harris Presidency will present challenges similar to those faced by the EU as Biden did, but the tensions will become more difficult to manage over time.
First, the EU will find pushing back against Harris much harder than Trump. There will be more goodwill from some Member States (including Poland and the Baltics), and there will have to be more constraint from countries most opposed to her priorities (chiefly Germany).
This matters especially when it comes to China policy. Maintaining a united position within the EU will become increasingly difficult. Already, we are seeing German Chancellor Scholz exploiting President Macron’s weakness to push back against the EU’s new China EV tariffs.
Second, the EU has historically only been able to make big consequential decisions when confronted with a sudden and sharp crisis. Any new EU borrowing ambitions, be it for defence or industrial policy, are much more likely to be agreed in a Trump scenario. Put differently, Trump’s noisy and outrageous style makes it easier for the EU to adapt than the subtle pressure expected from Harris.
Trump contingency planning has started
There is no formal Trump contingency planning being carried out by the European Commission or EU Member States, but many of the recent decisions have already been made with a Trump Presidency in mind.
This includes the swift approval of von der Leyen for a second term as Commission President to provide stability and avoid the possibility of several months of deadlock at a critical time. It also includes the nomination of former Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte as NATO Secretary General. Rutte has proven to be an effective communicator with Donald Trump.
There are also at least four policy areas where the EU is already adapting its thinking.
First, trade defence and competition. The EU is much better prepared for Trumpian trade wars than it was eight years ago. Now, a whole range of trade defence tools could easily be employed against the US to increase the costs of any hostile trade decisions by the White House. The EU’s activity in launching investigations against China this year is also a message to a potential Trump 2.0 Administration.
We are publishing a more detailed note tomorrow on the EU’s plans for responding to a universal Trump tariff.
Von der Leyen has also announced an overhaul of the EU’s competition policy, which could strengthen European companies in global competition.
Second, Ukraine funding. The EU is in a rush to finalise the €50 billion loan to Ukraine funded through frozen Russian assets. The assumption is that this will be the last support tool from the US for some time.
Third, defence. Increasing defence spending is a tool to appease Donald Trump and increase the EU’s defence autonomy. Von der Leyen is expected to make proposals in September and might well opt for the option of new EU borrowing if the political context is ripe.
Fourth, an EU-UK relaunch. After years of Brussels rejecting every offer from London to work on deepening trade ties, von der Leyen signalled a new approach when she set out her priorities in the European Parliament last week.
Conclusion
A Harris Presidency carries far fewer risks for Europe than a Trump Presidency would, which is why most EU leaders are rooting for her. But dealing with Kamala Harris would be anything but comfortable for EU leaders. She is expected to continue Biden’s transactional approach to transatlantic relations and will continue pushing the EU to take more responsibility for defence and Ukraine funding
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